Sequential aggregate signature schemes allow n signers, in order, to sign a message each, at a lower total cost than the cost of n individual signatures. We present a sequential aggregate signature scheme based on trapdoor permutations (e.g., RSA). Unlike prior such proposals, our scheme does not require a signer to retrieve the keys of other signers and verify the aggregateso-far before adding its own signature. Indeed, we do not even require a signer to know the public keys of other signers! Moreover, for applications that require signers to verify the aggregate anyway, our schemes support lazy verification: a signer can add its own signature to an unverified aggregate and forward it along immediately, postponing verification until load permits or the necessary public keys are obtained. This is especially important for applications where signers must access a large, secure, and current cache of public keys in order to verify messages. The price we pay is that our signature grows slightly with the number of signers.
The need for lazy verification
In applications with a large number of possible signers, the need to verify before signing can introduce a significant bottleneck, because each signer must retrieve the public keys of the previous signers before it can even begin to run its signing algorithm. Worse yet, signers need to keep their large caches of public keys secure and current: if a public key is revoked and a new one is issued, the signer must first obtain the new key and verify its certificate before adding its own signature to the aggregate.
A key application: BGPsec. Sequential aggregate signatures are particularly well-suited for the BGPsec [Lep12] (formerly known as the Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP) [KLS00] ), a protocol being developed to improve the security of the global Internet routing system. (This application was mentioned in several works, including [BGLS03, LOS + 06, Nev08] , and explored further in [ZSN05] .) In BGPsec, autonomous systems (ASes) digitally sign routing announcements listing the ASes on the path to a particular destination. An announcement for a path that is n hops long will contain n digital signatures, added in sequence by each AS on the path. (Notice that the length of the BGPsec message even without the signatures increases at every hop, as each AS adds its name to the path, as well as extra information to the material in the routing message like its "subject key identifier" -a cryptographic fingerprint that is used to look up its public key in the PKI [Lep12] .) The BGPsec protocol is faced with two key performance challenges:
1. Obtaining public keys. BGPsec naturally requires routers to have access to a large number of public keys; indeed, a routing announcement can contain information from any of the 41,000 ASes in the Internet [COZ08] (this number is according to the dataset retrieved in 2012). Certificates for public keys are regularly rolled over to maintain freshness, and must be retrieved from a distributed PKI infrastructure [Hus12] . Caching more than 41,000 public keys is expensive for a memory-constrained device like a router (which often does not have a hard drive or other secondary storage [KR06] ). Furthermore, whenever a router sees a BGPsec message containing a key that is not in its cache, it incurs non-trivial delay on certificate retrieval (from a distant device that hosts the PKI) and verification.
2. Dealing with routing table "dumps". When a link from a router to its neighboring router fails, the router receives a dump of the full routing table, often containing more than 300, 000 routes [CID] , from it neighbors. Because routers are CPU-and memory-constrained devices, dealing with these huge routing table dumps incurs long delays (up to a few minutes, even with plain, insecure BGP [BHMT09]!). The delays are exacerbated if cryptographic signing and verifying is added to the process, and even more so when a router comes online for the first time (or after failure) and needs to also retrieve and authenticate public keys for all the ASes on the Internet.
To deal with these issues, the BGPsec protocol gives a router the option to perform lazy verification: that is, to immediately sign the routing announcement with its own public key, and to delay verification until a later time, e.g., when (a) it has time to retrieve the public keys of the other signers, or (b) when the router itself is less overloaded and can devote resources to verification [DHS] . It is important to note that lazy verification by one router need not hurt others: if a router has not verified a given announcement, routers further in the chain can verify it for themselves. While there is legitimate concern that permitting lazy verification may cause routers to temporarily adopt unverified paths, the alternative may be worse: forbidding lazy verification can lead to problems with global protocol convergence (agreement on routes in the global Internet), because of routers that delay their announcements significantly until they can verify signatures (e.g., during routing table dumps, or while waiting to retrieve a missing certificate). Such delays create their own security issues, enabling easier denial of service attacks and traffic hijacking during the long latency window. Thus, even though BGPsec recommends that every router eventually verifies BGPsec messages, requiring that routers always verify before signing and re-announcing BGPsec messages is considered a nonstarter by the BGPsec working group [Sri12, Section 8.2.1]. Lazy verification is written into the BGPsec protocol specification as follows [Lep12, Section 7]: ...it is important to note that when a BGPSEC speaker signs an outgoing update message, it is not attesting to a belief that all signatures prior to its are valid.
Requirement: No public keys in the signing algorithm! Note that the primary obstacle here is not only verification time (which can perhaps be improved through batching and, anyway, can be considerably faster than signing time when using low-exponent RSA), but also the need to obtain public keys. Thus, lazy verification also requires that prior signers' public keys are not used in the signing algorithm (e.g., hashed with the message as in [LMRS04, Nev08] ). Requirement: No security risk from signing unverified aggregates! As we already mentioned, a signer who adds its own signature to an unverified aggregate in the schemes of [LMRS04] and [Nev08] is exposed to a devastating attack (Appendix A). We already discussed how lazy verification may cause a signer to do so. Moreover, even without lazy verification, BGPsec may sometimes require a signer to add its own signature to an aggregate that is invalid. One such situation is when a router knowingly adopts a path that fails verification-for example, if it is the only path to a particular destination (the specification allows this [Lep12, Section 5]). It will then add its own signature to the invalid one, because a "BGPSEC router should sign and forward a signed update to upstream peers if it selected the update as the best path, regardless of whether the update passed or failed validation (at this router)" [Sri12, Section 8.2.1]. The need to sign a possibly invalid aggregate also arises in the case each message is signed by two different signature schemes (as will happen during transition times from one signature algorithm to another), and "one set of signatures verifies correctly and the other set of signatures fails to verify." In such a case the signer should still "add its signature to each of the [chains] using both the corresponding algorithm suite" [Lep12, Section 7] . Even if all BGPsec adopters avoid lazy verification and always verify before signing, these guidelines make it impossible to adopt an aggregate signature scheme that does not permit signing unverified aggregates, because of the possibility of attack. In other words, lazy verification is still needed for security even if no one uses it for efficiency! Our goal. We note that lazy verification is permitted by the trivial solution of concatenating individual ordinary signatures, by aggregate signature schemes defined in [BGLS03] , and by historyfree aggregate signature schemes defined in [FLS11] . All of the above schemes do not require the current signer to know anything about the previous signers: neither their public keys nor the messages they signed. 3 Our goal is to obtain the same advantages, while relying on a more basic security assumption than the bilinear Diffie-Hellman of [BGLS03, FLS11] and saving space as compared to the trivial solution.
3 Identity-based aggregate signatures [YCK04, XZF05, CLW05, CLGW06, Her06, GR06, BGOY07, HLY09,  SVSR10, BJ10 ] also remove the need for obtaining public keys and have been proposed for use in BGPsec. However, agreeing on the secret-key-issuing authority for the global Internet seems politically infeasible. Moreover, on a technical level, the proposals either require interaction among signers or are based on bilinear pairings. Interactive signatures would significantly complicate the protocol. And if we are willing to rely on bilinear pairings, [BGLS03] already gives us an excellent choice that allows for lazy verification.
Synchronized aggregate signatures (identity-based ones of [GR06] and regular ones of [AGH10] ) also allow for lazy verification, but require a common nonce for all signers that, if repeated, breaks the security of the scheme. Implementing such a nonce in BGPsec presents its own challenges, because each signer has to ensure it never reuses a nonce, or else its secret key is at risk. The schemes are also pairing-based.
Overview of our contributions
We present a sequential aggregate signature scheme that is secure even with lazy verification, based on any trapdoor permutation (such as RSA). Moreover, as in the nonsequential scheme of [BGLS03] and the history-free scheme of [FLS11] , our signers do not need to know anything about each other-not even each other's public keys. To achieve this, we modify Neven's scheme [Nev08] by randomizing the H-hash function with a fresh random string per signer, which becomes a part of the signature, similarly to Coron's PFDH [Cor02] (Section 3). Our modification allows each signer to sign without verifying, and without even needing to know the public keys of all the signers that came before him, avoiding, in particular, the attack of Appendix A.
Although the ultimate goal in aggregate signatures is to produce schemes whose signature length is independent of the number of signers, signatures in our scheme grow slightly with the number of signers. However (as also pointed out by [Nev08] ), while a constant-length aggregate signature is a theoretically interesting goal, what usually matters in practice is the combined length of signatures and messages, because that's what verifiers receive: signatures rarely live on their own, separately from the messages they sign. And the combined length of messages, if they are distinct, grows linearly with the number of signers, so the total growth of the amount of information received by the verifier is anyway linear. What matters, then, is how fast this linear growth is; below we derive parameters that show it to be much smaller than when ordinary trapdoor-permutation-based signatures are used as in the trivial solution.
We make the following contributions:
Generic randomized scheme. We present the basic version of our scheme, which requires each signer to append a truly random string to the aggregate (Section 3). Our scheme is as efficient for signing and verifying (per signer) as ordinary trapdoor-permutation based signatures, like the Full-Domain-Hash (FDH, [BR93, Section4] ). We prove security (Section 4) in the random oracle model, based on the same assumption of trapdoor permutations (or claw-free permutations for a tighter security reduction) as in [Nev08] . Our security proof is more involved, because the reduction cannot know the public keys of other (adversarial) signers during the signature queries. We should note that our proof technique also shows that Neven's scheme need not hash other signer's public keys in the signing algorithm (however, Neven's scheme still fails under lazy verification).
Shortening the randomness. We show that the per-signer random string can be shorter if it is made input-dependent (Section 5), ensuring that a given signer never produces two different signatures on the same input. The idea of input-dependent randomness has been used before in signature schemes (e.g., [KW03, Section 4]); however, our application requires a new combinatorial argument to show security.
Instantiating with RSA. Appendix F shows how to instantiate our schemes with practical trapdoor permutations like RSA, which have slightly different domains for different signers.
Detailed specification.
We provide a full, parameterized step-by-step specification of the truly-random and input-dependent-random versions of our signature when instantiated with RSA (Appendix G). We also provide guidelines on choosing parameters such as bit lengths (Section H).
Implementation, benchmarking and practical considerations.
We implement our specification as a module in OpenSSL (Section 6); the implementation is available from [BGR11] . We compare our implementation's performance to other potential solutions that allow for lazy verification; namely, [BGLS03] , and the "trivial" solution of using n RSA or ECDSA signatures (the two algorithms currently proposed for use in implementations of BGPsec [DHS] ). When evaluating signatures schemes for use with BGPsec, we consider compute time as well as signature length. Thus, we show that our signature is shorter than trivial RSA when there are n > 1 signers and shorter than trivial ECDSA when there are n > 6 signers. (While our signature is longer than the constant-length [BGLS03] signature, it benefits from relying on the better-understood security assumption of RSA.) Moreover, our scheme enjoys the same extremely fast verify times as RSA.
Preliminaries
Sequential aggregate signature security.
The security definition for aggregate signatures (both original [BGLS03] and sequential [LMRS04] ) is designed to capture the following intuition: each signer is individually secure against existential forgery following an adaptive chosen-message attack [GMR88] regardless of what all the other signers do. In fact, we will allow the adversary to give the attacked signer arbitrary-perhaps meaningless-aggregate-so-far signatures during the signature queries, thus making them adaptive "chosen-message-and-aggregate" queries. We also allow the adversary, which we call "the forger," to choose the public keys of all the other signers and to place the single signer who is under attack anywhere in the signature chain in the attempted forgery. This single attacked signer does not know any public keys other than its own and does not verify any aggregate-so-far given by the attacker.
Our definition is almost verbatim from [LMRS04] , with one important difference needed to enable lazy verification: the public keys and messages of previous signers are not input to the signing algorithm. Therefore, each signer, by signing a message, is attesting only to that message, not to the prior signers' messages and public keys. At a technical level, this change implies that in security game the forger, in its query to ith signer, is required to supply only the aggregate-so-far signature allegedly produced by the first i − 1 signers, but not the messages or public keys with respect to which this aggregate was allegedly produced. And, of course, to be considered successful, the forger must use a new message-in other words, it is not enough to change a public key or message of someone else in the chain before the attacked signer (because such public keys and messages may not even be well defined during the attack). This definition is exactly the one that is satisfied by the trivial solution of concatenating n individual signatures (and therefore suffices, in particular, for BGPsec).
Formally, the adversary F is given a single public key and access to sequential aggregate signing oracle on the corresponding secret key. The advantage of F , Adv AggSig F , is defined to be its probability of success in the following game.
Setup. A key pair PK , SK is generated. The aggregate forger F is provided with PK , the challenge key.
Queries. F requests sequential aggregate signatures to be produced with SK on messages of its choice. For each query, it supplies an (alleged) sequential aggregate signature σ and an additional message m to be signed by the oracle under key SK . It can be adaptive, i.e., use the results of previous queries in order to decide on the current query.
Response. Finally, F outputs n distinct public keys PK 1 , . . . , PK n for some integer n of its choice. One of these keys must equal PK , the challenge key. Algorithm F also outputs messages m 1 , . . . , m n , and a sequential aggregate signature σ.
The forger wins if the sequential aggregate signature σ is a valid sequential aggregate signature on messages m 1 , . . . , m n under keys PK 1 , . . . , PK n , if PK = PK i * for some 1 ≤ i * ≤ n, and if σ is nontrivial, i.e., F never issued a query on the message m i * . Note that i * need not equal n: the forgery can be made in the middle of the sequence. The probability is over the coin tosses of the key-generation algorithm, the signing algorithm, and F .
In the random oracle model, F can also issue adaptive queries to the random oracle during its attack.
Fischlin, Lehmann, and Schröder [FLS11] propose a stronger security definition for their "historyfree" signatures (building on history-free MACs of [EFG + 10]), which prevents certain reordering and recombining of signatures. Their definition thus has a security property that the trivial solution of concatenating n individual signatures does not have. Although this security property is not needed in many applications (for example, in BGPsec reordering and recombining of signatures is prevented simply by the protocol message structure, where each message must, for the purposes of functionality, include all the signed information contained in previous messages), our signature scheme in fact also prevents reordering and recombining that are of concern to [FLS11] : see Appendix I.
Cryptographic primitives.
We will use pseudorandom function [GGM86] which we define here for the sake of completeness.
A pseudorandom function family (PRF) [GGM86] is one in which a randomly chosen function is indistinguishable from a truly random function by an observer of input-output behavior. We will consider only PRFs with variable input lengths and a fixed output length r . The formal definition we need is as follows: if PRF seed : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} r is a family of functions indexed by seed and D is an adversary that outputs a single bit (also known as distinguisher ), consider the following two experiments. In the first, seed is chosen at random (not shown to D), and D gets to ask for outputs of PRF seed on inputs of its choice. In the second, a completely random function f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} r is chosen at random, and D gets to ask for outputs of f on inputs of its choice. We will say the insecurity of PRF is the absolute value of the difference between the probabilities that D outputs 1 in the two experiments. We will denote by ε PRF (q, t) the maximum insecurity of PRF against any D who asks at mostueries and runs in time t.
We assume the reader is familiar with the trapdoor and claw-free permutations; we will denote by π the easy direction of the trapdoor permutation, by π −1 the hard direction, and by ρ the function such that it is hard to find a "claw" x, z with π(x) = ρ(z).
Our basic signature scheme
The intuition behind our construction is as follows. Like [Nev08] , we use a random-oracle-based signature with message recovery, similar to PSS-R [BR96] , as a basic building block. Signatures with message recovery embed a portion of the message into the signature, so it can be recovered on verification and does not need to be sent explicitly. In our case, the signature outputs two values: the output x of a trapdoor permutation and an additional hash value h. The i th signer receives (x i−1 , h i−1 ) from the previous signer and wants to sign a message m i . To enable aggregation, we view (x i−1 , m i ) together as a "message" to be signed with message recovery: we apply the signature with message recovery to this pair, so that x i−1 is embedded into the signature and does not have to be sent explicitly. The h portions of the signatures are exclusive-ored together for aggregation.
So far, what we described is a slightly simplified version of the scheme from [Nev08] . Note that verifying before signing is necessary in this scheme, because the transformation from (x i−1 , h i−1 ) to (x i , h i ) is deterministic, invertible, and can be performed by the adversary, except for the inversion of the trapdoor permutation performed at the last step. As we show in Appendix A, no scheme constructed in this manner can permit lazy verification while protecting against a chosen message attack. Thus, to enable lazy verification, we require each signer to add a random string to the message, and concatenate and append these strings to the signature. Because the adversary lacks a priori knowledge about these random strings, the chosen message attack becomes useless and we can prove that this is sufficient to enable lazy verification.
Notation. We now describe the scheme precisely, using the following notation:
• Let m i be the message signed by signer i.
• Let trapdoor permutation π i be the public key of signer i and π −1 i be the corresponding secret key. We assume all permutations operate on bit strings of length π , i.e., have domain and range {0, 1} π . (In Appendix F we remove the assumption that all permutations operate on the same domain. Section 6 uses this to instantiate π from the RSA assumption, where π i is the easy direction, and π −1 i is the hard direction of the RSA permutation.)
• Let H (resp. G) be a cryptographic hash function (modeled as a random oracle) that outputs H -bit (resp. π -bit) strings.
• Let r be a parameter denoting the length of the randomness appended by each signer.
• Let the notation a i denote a vector of values (a 1 , a 2 , ..., a i ).
• Let ⊕ to denote bitwise exclusive-or. Exclusive-or is not the only operation that can be used;
any efficiently computable group operation with efficient inverse can be used here.
• is a special character denoting the empty string; we assume ⊕ x = x for any x.
Sign: The i th Signer's algorithm
Require: Require: π n , m n , r n , x n , h n 1: for i = n, n − 1, ...., 2 do 2:
4:
6:
return 1 9: else 10:
return 0
The i th signer's signing algorithm has no dependency on the number of signers; it takes in only the i th signers' own public key and message and the aggregated portion of the signature x i−1 , h i−1 . Moreover, the aggregated signature need not be verified before it is signed. For verification, only a single x i and h i -namely, the one from the last signer-is needed. However, every r i , from the first signer to the last, is needed.
Security proof
We prove our scheme secure if G and H are modeled as random oracles and π is a trapdoor permutation. The proof is easier to understand if π is additionally claw-free (in particular, any homomorphic permutation, such as RSA, is claw-free if it is trapdoor). We therefore present the proof for the claw-free case. The more general case is addressed in Appendix E. Our proof shows how a forger F on the aggregate signature scheme can be used to construct a reduction R that finds a claw in claw-free pair (π * , ρ * ). R has F forge a signature for victim signer that uses permutation π * , and then uses the resulting forgery to find the claw in the claw-free pair. The structure of our reduction is similar to [Nev08] ; however, while [Nev08] constructs a "sequential forger" from forger F and then constructs reduction R from the sequential forger, our reduction must proceed in one step (since the notion of a sequential forger is undefined if hash queries do not include previous signers public keys).
F 's queries. We review what forger F expects to see on each one of its queries:
• H-Query. F asks query Q = (π, m, r, x) (where x may be ) and expects to see H(Q) = η.
• G-query. F asks query h, and expects to see g = G(h).
• Sign Query. F asks query (m, h, x) to be signed by π * , and expects to see r, h , x back, where r looks uniform, h = h ⊕ H(π * , m, r, x), and π * (x ) = G(h ) ⊕ x.
• Forgery. Finally, F outputs a forgery, σ = π n , m n , r n , x n , h n where π n = π * . (Value n is chosen by F ).
Simplifying assumptions about the forger F . The following simplifies our proof:
• We assume that the forger F forges the last signature in the signature chain; in other words, π n = π * and m n is a new message never queried by F to the signing oracle (whose public key is π * ). Indeed, any F can be easily modified to do so: if π * and a new message m n are present in π n but at location n < n, then we can run the verification algorithm loop for n − n iterations to obtain x n , h n and output σ = π n , m n , r n , x n , h n as the new forgery, which will be valid if an only if σ was valid. Note that we do not assume that π * (or any other public key) is present in the signature chain only once.
• We assume that before forger F outputs its forgery and halts, it makes hash queries on all the hashes that will be computed during the verification of its forgery. Moreover, we assume that the forger does not output an invalid forgery; instead, it halts and outputs ⊥. Indeed, any F can be modified to do so; simply run the verification algorithm upon producing the forgery, and check that m n is different from every message asked in a sign query.
Description of the reduction R

Data structures used by R
HT and GT tables. The reduction R uses 'programmable random oracles', i.e., it chooses answers for random oracle queries. R keeps track of queries whose answers have already been decided in two tables: HT for H and GT for G. We say HT(Q) = η if HT stores η as the answer to a query Q, and HT(Q) = ⊥ if HT has no answer for Q (similar for GT).
The HTree. The key challenge for the reduction is programming G, since G-queries are made on sums of H-query answers, rather than on individual H-query answers. Thus the reduction keeps an additional data structure, the HTree, that records responses to H-queries that may eventually be used as part of forger F 's forgery. (HTree is inspired by the graph G in [Nev08, Lemma 5.3] .)
The HTree is a tree of labeled nodes that stores a subset of the queries in HT. Each node in HTree (except the root) corresponds to an H-query that could potentially appear in the forger F 's final forgery σ; the queries asked during verification of σ will appear on a path from one of the leaf nodes to the root (unless a very unlikely event occurs). The HTree has a designated root node that stores the value h 0 = 0. We consider the root to be at depth 0. A node N i at depth i > 0 stores:
• a pointer to its parent node • the 'hash-response' values η i and h i (h i is the XOR of the values η 1 , . . . , η i on the path from the root to the node N i ; equivalently, h i−1 ⊕ η i , where h i−1 is stored in the parent node),
• an auxiliary value y i that is used to determine how future queries are added to the HTree, computed as G(h i ) ⊕ x i−1 (note that y i is the value to which the signer would apply π
an auxiliary value z that may be used to find a claw in (π * , ρ * ).
Every node at depth i = 2 or deeper satisfies the relation π i−1 (x i−1 ) = y i−1 , where π i−1 and y i−1 are stored at the node's parent. New H-queries Q are added as nodes to the HTree if they can satisfy this relation; we say that such a query can be tethered to an existing node in the HTree. Intuitively, a query tethered to N i becomes a child of N i in the HTree:
Definition 4.1 (Tethered queries). An H-query Q containing x = is tethered to node N i in the HTree if N i stores π i , y i such that π i (x) = y i . If x = , then Q is tethered to the root of the HTree.
The HTree's Lookup function (Algorithm 1) determines the HTree node to which query Q can be tethered. (Lemma B.3 argues that Lookup finds at most one node with high probability.) The HTree is populated via the Sim-H algorithm (Algorithm 4). The reduction R adds an H-query Q to the HTree if and only if it is tethered to some node in the HTree at the time that forger F makes the H-query. It is possible that some query Q is not tethered at the time it is made, but becomes tethered at at later time (after some new nodes are added to the HTree). However, Claim B.9 shows that this is highly unlikely.
Algorithms used by R
The reduction R uses the following algorithms (Algorithms 1-5).
G-queries. R answers these queries using a simple algorithm Sim-G (Algorithm 2). Sim-G returns GT(h) if it is already defined, or, if not, returns a fresh random value and records it in the GT.
Sign-queries The reduction R answers queries (m, h, x) to be signed by π * using Sim-S (Algorithm 5). Since the reduction does not know the inverse of the challenge permutation π −1 * , it 'fakes' a valid signature by carefully assigning certain entries in random oracle tables HT, GT, and ABORTS if these entries in HT, GT have been previously assigned. Later, we argue that Sim-S is unlikely to abort, since the entries added to HT, GT by Sim-S depend on a fresh random value r chosen as part of each signature query (Lemma B.7).
H-queries
The reduction R answers these queries Q = (π, m, r, x) using Sim-H (Algorithm 4). If there is an entry for Q in the HT, then Sim-H returns it. Otherwise, it assigns a fresh random value η as HT(Q). Next, Sim-H needs to prepare for the event that Q could lead to a forgery by the forger F , and thus needs to be stored in the HTree. To do this, Sim-H uses the Lookup function to check if Q can be tethered and thus should be added to the HTree. If Q can be tethered, Sim-H adds a new node to the HTree containing Q, its hash response η, and an auxiliary value y that is used by the Lookup function to tether future H-queries. In order to ensure that HTree is a tree (Lemma B.3), it is important to ensure that y is a fresh random value; Sim-H aborts if that's not the case. Finally, if Q contains the challenge permutation π * , Sim-H adds a value z to the HTree node that FindClaw will use to derive a claw from a valid forgery output by the forger F . To prepare these values, Sim-H behaves almost as if it is 'faking' the answer to a sign-query, except that instead of using the usual challenge permutation π * (as in Sim-S), it uses the challenge permutation ρ * applied to z (so as to benefit from forger F 's forgery, which would invert π * on the output of ρ * (z), thus producing a claw). As in Sim-S, this involves carefully assigning certain entries in GT, and aborting if these entries are already assigned. (Claim B.6 shows that Sim-H is unlikely to abort.)
return Root node of HTree 3: else 4: Nodelist = {all nodes N in HTree containing π, y such that π(x) = y} 5:
if Nodelist contains more than one node then 6: return the single node in Nodelist
ABORT 4: Retrieve z n the node N n 5: return Claw (x n , z n ).
Algorithm 4 Sim-H: Answering an H-Query
HT(Q) ← η 4:
Create new node N i with parent N i−1
7:
Retrieve h i−1 from parent N i−1
8:
if GT(h i ) = ⊥ then 10:
13:
Populate node N i with Q, η, h i , y i 15:
Populate node N i with Q, η, h i , y i , z i 19:
GT(h ) ← y ⊕ x 13: else 14:
Finding a claw. Finally, forger F outputs a forgery π n , m n , r n , x n , h n , where π n = π * . Recall that our simplifying assumptions mean that the forgery is valid. The reduction R uses FindClaw (Algorithm 3) to find a claw from the forgery. Because we assumed all the queries for verifying σ have already been asked, the query (π * , m n , r n , x n−1 ) is in HT. Moreover, if the forgery is valid, then with high probability it is in the HTree as a child of the node storing (π n−1 , m n−1 , r n−1 , x n−2 ), which is in turn a child of the node storing (π n−2 , m n−2 , r n−2 , x n−3 ), etc. This holds because in a valid forgery, each H-query made during verification is tethered to the next one, and, by Claim B.9, all tethered queries are in the HTree with high probability. The value x n (from the forgery σ) and value z n (from HTree node of the query Q = (π * , m n , r n , x n−1 )) constitute a claw.
Analysis of the reduction
Theorem 4.2. If a forger F succeeds with probability ε, then the reduction R finds a claw for (π * , ρ * ) in about the same running time as F with probability
where q H is the number of H-hash queries, q G is the number of G-hash queries, and q S is the number of sign queries made by the forger F .
We prove this theorem in Appendix B. The proof hinges on two key statements about the HTree. First (Claim B.5), the probability that Lookup(x) finds more than one HTree node is low (even though Lookup uses the functions π stored in the nodes of the HTree, which do not have to be permutations, because they are adversarially supplied and not certified like in [LMRS04] ). Second (Claim B.9), an H-query that was not added to HTree is unlikely to become tethered at some later time. Both statements rely on the fact (proven in Claim B.4) that each time a query is placed on the HTree, its y value is random and independent of every other y value.
Shorter signatures via input-dependent randomness
To shorten our signature, we now show how to reduce r (the length of the randomness appended by each signer). To do this, we replace the truly random r from our basic scheme with an r that is computed as a function of the inputs to the signer, and argue that it can be made shorter than the random r. Intuitively, we are able to maintain security with a shorter r because a given signer never produces two different signatures on the same input, thus limiting the information that an adversary can see and exploit. Of course, this input-dependent r need not be truly random; it suffices for a r to be a pseudorandom function of the input.
Modifying the scheme
We now compute r as a pseudorandom function (PRF) over the input (m i , h i−1 , x i−1 ) received by that signer i. Let PRF seed : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} r be a PRF with seed seed and insecurity ε PRF (q, t) against adversaries askingueries and running in time t. Add a uniformly chosen seed to the secret key of the signer and replace line 1 of the signing algorithm with r ← PRF seed (m, h, x).
In the previous section, we found that r must be long enough to tolerate a security loss of q S (q H + q S )2 − r (Theorem 4.2). As we show below, r in the modified scheme can be shorter, since it needs only to allow for a security loss of approximately (q G + q H + q S + H q 2 S )2 − r . This is an improvement if we assume that q H ≈ q G (since both H and G are hash functions) and q S q H (since in practice hash queries can be made offline, while signing queries need access to an actual signer).
Key insight for the security proof
Using the reduction of Section 4, we had to choose r long enough to make it unlikely that when a forger makes a sign query on (π * , m i , x i−1 , h i−1 ), the algorithm Sim-S draws a random r i that collides with a previously made H-query Q i = (π * , m i , r i , x i−1 ). Indeed, if Q i was answered by η i and the forger chooses h i−1 so that h i (which is computes as h i−1 ⊕ η i ) has already been queried to G, then when r collides, the reduction would be prevented from programming the random oracle G(h i ). Making r depend on the forger's input to the signer means that the forger gets only one chance (rather than q S chances) to make this happen for a given Q i , h i−1 , and h i , because subsequent attempts by the forger will use the same r.
Proof Sketch. The full statement and proof of the security theorem for the modified scheme is in Appendix C. We modify the reduction R to not abort if HT already contains the relevant H-query. Specifically, we replace the ABORT on line 4 of Sim-S (Algorithm 5) with η ← HT(Q) .
(All the rest of R's algorithms are unchanged.) As such, we must now consider a new case where Sim-S aborts; namely, if Sim-S draws an r that defines a query Q = (π * , m, r, x) that is already in HT and the value h = η ⊕ h is already stored in the GT (where recall that η = HT(Q) and h was given as part of the query to Sim-S). Call such r bad for m, h, x. How likely is it that Sim-S draws a bad r?
Proof. Consider a matrix ζ whose rows are indexed by queries (i.e., h ) in GT and whose columns are indexed by queries in HT that start with π * (i.e., , there is a column for each Q = (π * , m, r, x) ∈ HT). The entry in row h and column Q is h = h ⊕ η, where η = HT(Q). Sim-S draws an r that is bad for m, h, x if and only if it (a) draws an r such that Q = (π * , m, r, x) ∈ HT, and (b) h exists in the Q th column of ζ. Thus, we will say that a column Q = (π * , m, r, x) of ζ is bad for (m, h, x) if at least one of the entries in that column is h (denote the set of such columns BAD(m, h, x)). The number of r values that are bad for a particular triple (m, h, x) is equal to the number of columns that are bad for that triple, and thus the probability that a bad r is chosen by Sim-S when responding to (m, h, x) is equal to 2 − r · |BAD(m, h, x)|. Now consider all the queries that have a given h. Note that the bad columns do not overlap for such queries (because each column is labeled with m and x). By the union bound, the probability that Sim-S draws a bad r during any signature query with h is at most 2 − r · m,x |BAD(m, h, x)|. Since the bad columns do not overlap, m,x |BAD(m, h, x)| is bounded by the number of times h occurs in ζ. Thus, we can bound the overall probability that Sim-S ever draws a bad r by at most:
# of times the i th most frequent entry appears in ζ .
The claim follows from the answer to the following combinatorial problem.
Combinatorial problem. Suppose β values η 1 , . . . , η β are chosen uniformly at random as H -bit strings and given to an adversary, who then chooses α distinct values h 1 , . . . , h α . The α × β-matrix ζ is constructed by XORing the η and the h values. A collision in ζ is a set of entries that are all equal. What is the total number of entries in the γ biggest collisions? (with SHA-256 hashing and RSA public exponent of 65537); the BGLS scheme was implemented using MIRACL [Sco11] (with the curve BN-128 [BN05] and with precomputation on the curve generator but not on the public keys; further precomputation on the public keys seems to improve verification performance by up to 20% at the cost of additional storage). Results for specific values of n are not exactly in proportion due to rounding.
Theorem 5.2. With probability at least 1 − β 2 2 H , the total size of the γ biggest collisions in ζ is at most α + ( h + 2)γ 2 .
We can use Theorem 5.2 (proved in Appendix D) to bound the probability of choosing a bad r. α is the size of GT, which is at most q G + q H + q S . β is the number of HT entries, which is at most q S + q H . γ is at most q S . Then, the claim follows by observing that the probability that Sim-S ever aborts is at most (a) the probability that the event of Theorem 5.2 doesn't hold, which is at most β 2 2 − H = (q S + q H ) 2 2 − H , plus (b) the probability that, even though the event of Theorem 5.2 holds, a bad r is chosen, which is at most (α + ( h + 2)γ 2 )2 − r ≤ (q G + q H + q S + ( h + 2)q 2 S )2 − r .
Implementation and Evaluation
In Section F we present technical arguments for how our schemes can be instantiated with RSA. We present a full specification of our schemes in Section G. We implemented the input-dependent-r version as a module in OpenSSL [ope]. The code is available from [BGR11] .
Overview of our implementation. We instantiate the permutation π with 2048-bit RSA with public exponent 65537, hash H with SHA-256, full-domain hash G with the industry-standard Mask Generating Function (MGF) using SHA-256 [RSA02] , and the pseudorandom function PRF with HMAC-SHA-256 [BCK96] . Instead of hashing the permutation π as-is inside the hash function H, we replace it with a short fingerprint of the RSA public key computed using SHA-256. Thus, we have parameters π = 2048, h = 256, and r = 128; the r value is per signer, and each signer also adds one bit of information to deal with the problem that RSA gives each signer a slightly different domain (see Section F). Therefore, the length of the aggregate signature for n signers is 2048 + 256 + 129n bits long (see Table 1 ). We justify this choice of parameters in Appendix H.
Evaluation.
We compare the implementation described in the previous paragraph to other signature schemes that allow for lazy verification. Table 1 contains data on our scheme as well as the "trivial" solution of using n RSA signatures, the solution of similarly using n ECDSA [Van92, IEE02] signatures (which are current contenders for adoption in BGPsec [Sri12, Section 4.1]), and the aggregate scheme of [BGLS03] (we do not compare against [FLS11] , because it is a more complicated version of [BGLS03] , so [BGLS03] performs better than [FLS11] , anyway). In addition to providing formulas in terms of the number n of signers, we show results for specific values of n = 4.5 and n = 7. The value of 4.5 was chosen because it is roughly the average length of an AS path for a well-connected router on the Internet today (average length fluctuates with time and vantage point-see, e.g., here [Smi12] ). We should note, however, that performance for higher than average values of n is particularly important: transition to BGPsec is expected to be particularly problematic for weaker routers, which are more likely to be located to in the less well-connected portions of the Internet, and that experience longer than average paths. We therefore also show results for n = 7.
The table shows that the [BGLS03] scheme is a clear winner in terms of signature length and signing time, but has considerably slower verification 4 . It should be noted, however, that it is not being considered for the BGPsec standard at this stage [Sri12, Section 4.1]: schemes relying on bilinear Diffie-Hellman are not considered ready for worldwide deployment on the internet backbone by the BGPsec working group, because a consensus has not emerged on which curves provide the right tradeoff between security and efficiency (for example, there is not a NIST-approved set of curves such as the one contained in [NIS09, Appendix D] for non-pairing-based elliptic-curve cryptography). It is also important to note that the time required to compute group operations and bilinear pairings depends very heavily on the curve used; improvements for various curves are produced frequently, and there is no generally accepted set of curves or algorithms at this point. We believe that, assuming continued progress to speed-up pairings on specific curves and sufficient confidence in the security of bilinear Diffie-Hellman on these curves, the scheme of [BGLS03] (as improved by [BNN07] ) should be considered for real applications.
As far as the remaining three schemes are concerned, we observe that ECDSA provides the shortest signatures when n < 6, while our scheme dominates the three for n > 6 (as we already mentioned, performance for higher than average n is particularly important.) We also observe that our scheme has computation time almost identical to simple RSA while having much shorter signatures (RSA signature length is listed as a particular concern in [Sri12, Section 4.1.2]). While ECSDA has the fastest signing time, the verification times for RSA and our scheme are an order of magnitude faster than those of ECDSA. Note that, for a router, the time required to sign does not depend on n, but the time required to verify grows linearly with n, so verification times are also of particular importance to weaker routers at the edge of the network.
Thus, if one is interested in a scheme based on the standard assumption of trapdoor permutations (albeit in the random oracle model), then our proposal fits the bill. Moreover, even if one is willing to accept security of ECDSA (which is not known to follow from any standard assumptions), our scheme may be preferable based on fast verify times and comparable-length signatures. Our scheme also has much faster verifying that pairing-based BGLS.
A Lazy verification and prior TDP-based proposals
[LMRS04] is a sequential aggregate signature that produces a constant length aggregate x i . Using the notation of Section 3, the signature algorithm requires the i th signer to compute the aggregate x i from the aggregate-so-far x i−1 as follows:
The security of [LMRS04] relies on the fact that the i th signer verifies x i−1 before producing x i as above. We now show how an adversary can forge a valid signature on a message m i = m i by adversarially malforming the aggregate-so-far. Suppose the adversary knows that the i th signer is signing the message m i . In that case, playing the role of the first i − 1 signers, he sets
where x i−1 is a valid signature on messages m 1 , . . . , m i−1 . If the i th signer now produces a signature using the invalid aggregate-so-far x i−1 , then a little algebraic manipulation shows that the adversary now possesses a valid signature on messages m 1 , . . . , m i−1 , m i , and thus the security of [LMRS04] does not hold under lazy verification. The analogue of this attack also works on [Nev08] . Here, the adversary malforms only the hash value h i−1 as:
In fact, more generally, consider any scheme that, like [LMRS04] and [Nev08] , operates as follows. The ith signer takes the aggregate-so-far (let's denote by it s i−1 ), applies some transformation T to it that depends on the message m i (let's denote it by t i = T m i (s i−1 )), and then applies π This problem seems fundamental with the design paradigm: verification recovers every intermediate aggregate signature, so the function T m i needs to be invertible, but its invertability is what allows the attack. Any approach that tinkers with T m i will not result in a scheme that permits lazy verification. We thus need a different design paradigm-changing T m i to a randomized function is essentially what our scheme proposes.
B Proof of Theorem 4.2
Our proof proceeds in two steps. First, we argue that with high probability forger F will not detect that it is interacting with the reduction R rather than the real oracles. To do so, we define the view of forger F to be everything F sees during a run, including F 's input (the public key), F 's private coin flips, and the answers F receives to its H, G, and signature queries. The reduction, unlike the real execution, may abort before F outputs its forgery, in which cases we call the view of F "aborted." F 's inability to detect that it is interacting with the reduction R follows from the following two lemmas.
Lemma B.1 (Correct Simulation). For every view that is not aborted, the probability that F sees that view when interacting with the reduction is the same as the probability F sees that view in the real execution.
Lemma B.2 (Abort Probability). The reduction R aborts (either before or after the forger F outputs the forgery) with probability at most
Thus, if forger F outputs a forgery with probability ε when interacting with the real signer, then, by the union bound, the probability that it outputs a forgery and the reduction does not abort is at least ε − Pr[ABORT ] (indeed, consider the union of two bad events: F doesn't output a forgery or the reduction aborts). But if the reduction does not abort, then it outputs a claw (x n , z n ). By Lemma B.8, π * (x n ) = y n , where y n is the value stored with the node N n . And by construction of y n on line 17 of Sim-H (Algorithm 4), ρ * (z n ) = y n . Hence, the reduction succeeds in finding a claw. It suffices to prove the two lemmas, which we do below.
B.1 Proof of Correct Simulation Lemma B.1
The public key given to forger F and F 's private coin flips are the same in the simulation and in the real execution. Thus, it remains to show that the reduction R correctly simulates H-queries, G-queries, and Sign-queries. Indeed, consider a not aborted view of F obtained during interaction with reduction R.
• H-queries. For every H-query in the view, the answer was placed into HT by Sim-H (Algorithm 4) or Sim-S (Algorithm 5). Each produced the HT entry by drawing an independent uniformly random η, just like the real execution random oracle. The probability of that particular answer is 2 − H in both cases.
• G-queries. Consider a G-query in the view. Sim-G responded to that G query by returning a value from the GT. Values are assigned to the GT by Sim-G,Sim-H, and Sim-S, so it suffices to show that each of these algorithms assigns a fresh uniformly random value to the GT, which would guarantee that the particular value seen in the view was assigned with probability 2 − π , just like the real execution random oracle. First, Sim-G assigns values g to GT by choosing them uniformly at random (Algorithm 2). Next, Sim-H assigns the value g(h i ) = ρ * (z i ) ⊕ x to the GT, where z i is a fresh random value, and ρ * is a permutation (Algorithm 4). Since the domain of ρ * is equal to the range of G, and ρ * is a permutation, it follows that ρ * (z i ) is uniformly random in the range of G. It therefore follows that g is a uniform random value. Similarly, Sim-S assigns the value g(h ) = π * (x ) ⊕ x, for a fresh random value x and a permutation π * , so g(h ) is also a uniform random value.
• Sign-queries. Observe that, given the answers to the relevant H and G queries and the input (m, h, x), there is a unique correct pair h , x for every r. The value r appears in the view as the result of a uniformly random choice in both the simulated execution and the real one. The answers to the relevant H and G queries are also results of uniformly random choices in both cases, by the arguments made for H-and G-queries. And h , x are the unique correct values in both cases.
B.2 Proof of Abort Probability Lemma B.2
It suffices to compute the probability that Lookup, Sim-H, Sim-G, Sim-S, and FindClaw abort and to add them up by union bound. Sim-G never aborts. The following four lemmas address the remaining four algorithms, in order.
Lemma B.3. The probability that Lookup ever aborts during the whole execution is at most
Proof. Lookup(x) aborts when the HTree contains two nodes, N 1 and N 2 , such that a Lookup collision occurs, i.e., π 1 (x) = y 1 and π 2 (x) = y 2 .
Because the size of the HTree is bounded by q H , it suffices to show that, for every pair of nodes N 1 , N 2 , the probability that there exists x such that Equation 5 holds is at most 2 − π . We will do so by proving two claims.
Claim B.4. When a node N i storing π i , y i is added to the HTree, then y i is chosen uniformly at random and independent of all prior choices made in the interaction between the forger F and the reduction R.
Proof. Recall that nodes are added to the HTree by Sim-H. From Sim-H, if π i = π * , then we can think of y i as fresh random value, since y i ← ρ * (z i ), where z i is a fresh random value and ρ * is a permutation. If π i = π * , then y i is chosen in a slightly more complex manner. Note from Sim-H that y i ← Sim-G(h i ) ⊕ x. Sim-G returns a uniform random value for each new input, and so it follows that y i will be a fresh random value as long as GT is not defined on h i . But if GT is defined on h i , then Sim-H will abort, so N i will not be added to the tree, anyway.
Lookup(x) is unlikely to find more than one node. Next, we need to show that the probability that there exists an x such that Equation 5 holds is small. To do this, we need to bound the probability that there are nodes N 1 and N 2 in HTree storing π 1 , y 1 and π 2 , y 2 such that there exists x with π 1 (x) = y 1 and π 2 (x) = y 2 . Note that forger F can adversarially-choose π 1 , π 2 stored in nodes N 1 and N 2 (since F issues a H-query that sets the π i stored at each HTree node). Indeed, we have the following process: F chooses π 1 first, and then is given a independent random y 1 , then chooses π 2 with knowledge of π 1 , y 1 , and finally is given independent random y 2 (Claim B.4). Thus, we cannot assume that π 1 , π 2 are permutations; however, we may assume that they are functions:
Claim B.5. For any two functions π 1 , π 2 with domain {0, 1} π , and two uniformly random values y 1 , y 2 in {0, 1} π , there exists x such π 1 (x) = y 1 and π 2 (x) = y 2 with probability at most 2 − π .
Proof. Define the set of preimages of y 1 under π 1 as S y 1 = {x | π 1 (x) = (y 1 )}. Suppose |S y 1 | = α. Then there are at most α choices of y 2 that will result in the event that there exists x such π 1 (x) = y 1 and π 2 (x) = y 2 , because each element x ∈ S y 1 gives rise to at most one y 2 = π 2 (x). Because y 2 is chosen uniformly from a set of size 2 π , the probability that x satisfying π 1 (x) = y 1 and π 2 (x) = y 2 exists is at most α2 − π . Thus, the desired probability is at most
Observing that α α · |{y 1 s.t. |S y 1 | = α}| = |Domain(π 1 )| = 2 π , we get the desired bound.
Lemma B.3 follows by combining Claims B.4 and B.5.
Lemma B.6. A single invocation of Sim-H aborts on line 10 with probability at most (
Proof. From Algorithm 4, we see that Sim-H aborts only if GT already stores some value for h i . First observe that there are at most q G + q S + q H queries stored in the GT. (There are q G G-queries, and every signing and H-query query adds at most one additional entry to GT.) Next, observe that h i = h i−1 ⊕ η where η is a fresh random value. Thus, the probability that h i collides with a value already in GT is bounded by (q G + q S + q H )2 − H .
Lemma B.7. A single invocation of Sim-S aborts with probability at most
Proof. There are two cases in which Sim-S aborts.
Abort due to H-collision. Sim-S on input (m, h, x) will abort on line 4 if it draws a random value r such that Q = (π * , m, r, x) exists in the HT. The number of entries in HT cannot exceed q H + q S , because those are the only queries that add entries (at most one each) to HT. Because r i is a fresh random value, the probability it collides with one of these entries is bounded by (q H + q S )2 − r .
Abort due to G-collision. Sim-S will abort on line 14 if GT already stores some value for h . The same argument as in Lemma B.6 shows that this happens with probability at most (q S + q G + q H )2 − H .
Lemma B.8. The probability of abort on line 3 of FindClaw is at most
And if the abort does not happen, then π * (x n ) = y n , where y n is stored with N n .
Proof. Suppose the forger F outputs a forgery σ = ( π n , m n , r n , h n , x n ) with π n = π * that is valid relative to HT, GT, which means that FindClaw is invoked.
Consider running the verification algorithmVer HT,GT (σ) to verify the forgery σ. The verification algorithm asks a sequence of H-queries Q n , ..., Q 1 , where Q 1 = (π 1 , r 1 , m 1 , ) and Q i = (π i , m i , r i , x i−1 ) for every i = 2...n. We know that all these queries have been asked by forger F and are therefore in HT. Let η n , . . . , η 1 be the answers to these queries. Note that these queries could not have been placed into HT by Sim-S, because m n is different from every message queried to Sim-S with π * . Thus, they were asked by the forger to Sim-H.
The verification algorithm also asks a sequence of G-queries h n , . . . , h 1 , where h n−1 = h n ⊕η n−1 , h n−2 = h n−1 ⊕ η n−1 , . . . , h 1 = h 2 ⊕ η 2 . Because the forgery is valid, h 1 = η 1 , and therefore h i = i j=1 η j . Note that all these G queries are in GT. Note that Q 1 is tethered to the root of the HTree by Definition 4.1, and will therefore be placed in the HTree by Sim-H with the value h 1 = η 1 . Because the forgery is valid, the x 1 value in Q 2 must satisfy π 1 (x 1 ) = y 1 , where y 1 = G(h 1 ). Thus, Q 2 is tethered to Q 1 . That does not necessarily mean that Q 2 itself is in the HTree. However, if it is, then it has the values h 2 = h 1 ⊕ η 2 and y 2 = G(h 2 ⊕ x 1 ) stored in it. Thus, if Q 2 is in the HTree, then Q 3 is tethered to Q 2 , because x 2 in Q 3 must satisfy π 2 (x 2 ) = y 2 , because that condition on Q 3 is necessary in order for the verification algorithm to query Q 2 . Similarly, if Q 3 is in the HTree, then Q 4 must be tethered to it. By induction, either there exists i > 1 such that Q i is tethered to Q i−1 but is not in the HTree, or all Q 1 , . . . , Q n are in the HTree. In the latter case, Lookup(x n ), if it does not abort, will return the node for the query Q n (because Q n was asked during verification, which happens only if π n (x n ) = y n ), and thus FindClaw will not abort.
H-queries are unlikely to get tethered after they are asked. Thus, we have shown that, if FindClaw doesn't abort, then π n (x n ) = y n (note that π n = π * ), and that FindClaw will never abort unless there exists a query Q that was asked to Sim-H, is tethered to another query in HTree, but is not in the HTree. The following claim bounds the probability that this happens to a single H-query. To bound the probability that a tethered H-query exists outside the HTree, we add up over all q H queries, to obtain q 2 H 2 2 − π by the union bound. Claim B.9. If an H-query did not get added to HTree (equivalently, if it was untethered at the time it was asked to Sim-H), then the probability it will ever become tethered is at most q H 2 − π , where q H is the number of H queries made after it.
Proof. Consider queries as they are added to HT in order. Suppose j 0 -th query Q = (π, m, r, x) was added as the result of a query to Sim-H and was untethered at the time it was asked, i.e., the HTree was such that Lookup(x) = ⊥. Now suppose that Q first becomes tethered after some j 1 -th query, Q = (π , m , r , x ), is placed in HT. From the definition of a tethered query, Q must have been added to the HTree. Thus, we must have j 1 > j 0 , because we never remove nodes from HTree (i.e., we cannot have j 1 < j 0 ) and Q itself is not added to the HTree (thus, j 1 = j 0 ). Since nodes are added to the HTree only when Sim-H is called on a new query, it follows that Q was added to HTree after forger F asked a new H-query, so that the following collision occurs:
But, y is a uniform random value that is independent of π and x (Claim B.4), so the collision in equation (6) occurs with probability 2 −|y| = 2 − π . This holds for each of the q H queries that could have been asked after j 0 , and the claim follows by the union bound.
This concludes the proof of Lemma B.8
Finally, Sim-H is called at most q H times, Sim-S is called at most q S times, FindClaw is called once and thus Lemma B.2 holds by a union bound.
C Analysis of the Scheme with Input-Dependent Randomness
We present only on the parts of the proof that are different from Theorem 4.2.
Changes to the reduction R. We will assume that forger F never makes the same signature query twice, because it would get the same result, anyway (formally, we can always modify F not to ask the same signature query twice by keeping a table of previously requested signature queries). Reduction R uses the same algorithms as before, except that we replace the ABORT on line 4 of Sim-S (Algorithm 5) with η ← HT(Q).
Theorem C.1. If a forger F succeeds in forging a signature for the modified scheme with probability ε, then the modified reduction R finds a claw for (π * , ρ * ) in about the same running time as F with probability
where q H is the number of H-hash queries, q G is the number of G-hash queries, q S is the number of sign queries made by the forger F , and t is the running time of the forger and the reduction combined.
Changes to Lemma B.1. Because Line 1 of Sim-S uses a truly random rather than a pseudorandom r, the probabilities of non-aborting views are no longer the same. However, by a standard reduction to the security of the PRF, the probability that forger F produces a forgery from a nonaborting view in the simulation must be at least ε − ε PRF .
Changes to Lemma B.2. This lemma changes only in Lemma B.7. The new version is:
Lemma C.2. The probability that, during any of the q S queries, Sim-S aborts is at most
Proof. When does the modified Sim-S abort? When h = η ⊕ h is in GT. There are two cases. First, if η (and thus h ) is a fresh random value, then the same argument used in Lemma B.7 holds, so abort probability is at most (q S + q G + q H )2 − H . However, we must now consider a new case where Sim-S aborts; namely, if η is not a fresh random value. η will not be a fresh random value if Sim-S is given a sign query (π * , m, x, h) and draws an r that defines a query Q = (π * , m, r, x) that is (a) already in HT and (b) the value h = η ⊕ h is already stored in the GT (where recall that η = HT(Q) and h was given as part of the query to Sim-S). Call such r bad for the sign-query's m, h, x. In Claim 5.1 we argued that Sim-S draws a bad r with probability at most (q G + q H + q S + ( h + 2)q 2 S )2 − r D Combinatorial interlude: A proof of Theorem 5.2
Here we solve the combinatorial problem of Section 5. We start with a prelude problem:
A Prelude Problem. Suppose β values η 1 , . . . , η β are chosen uniformly at random as H -bit strings and the β × β matrix θ is computed as θ ij = η i ⊕ η j . The diagonal of θ has all zero entries. Can we bound the size C θ of the biggest nonzero collision within θ?
Lemma D.1. With probability at least 1 − β 2 2 − H , all the η j values are distinct and C θ ≤ 2 h + 4.
Proof. Since we are not considering the 0 collision, we can remove the diagonal from our consideration and, in fact, focus only on the upper triangle of elements above the diagonal (the elements below the diagonal are equal to them, so we will get a nonzero collision of size 2k in θ if and only if we have k elements colliding in the upper triangle). Note that entries in a given row or given column are always distinct, unless η i = η j for some i = j, which happens with probability no more than β 2 2 2 − H . Consider the event that there is a collision of size k in the upper triangle or the η j values are not distinct; let p k be its probability. We can consider all subsets of k entries of the upper triangle in two parts: those subsets in which at least two elements share a row or a column (which, taken altogether, are covered by the case of nondistinct η j values), and those in which all columns are distinct and all rows are distinct. Taking a union bound over all k-element subsets then gives us
The constraint i 1 < j 1 , . . . , i k < j k comes from the fact that we are only considering the upper triangle. Because, for every a, the index j a is greater than j 1 , . . . , j a−1 and therefore also greater than i 1 , . . . , i a , and the value η ja was chosen uniformly at random, we get that the value η ja is independent of η i 1 ⊕ η j 1 = · · · = η i a−1 ⊕ η j a−1 , and of η ia , and therefore the a th element η ia ⊕ η ja of the subset is independent of all the previous elements of the subset. This implies that (subject to the distinctness requirement on the i a s and
We have thus bounded the probability that a given k-element subset with distinct rows and distinct columns is a collision. That is, we bounded each addend of the sum in Equation 7. How many such subsets are there? There are β rows, β columns, and we are choosing k distinct rows and k distinct columns, so there are at most 2β 2k of them. Thus, the sum has at most 2β 2k addends. Substituting into the above formula, we get
Observe that we can assume β 2 /2 H < 1 (otherwise, the statement of the lemma is vacuous). So if k ≥ 4, then k 2 > 2e 2 and thus β 2 e 2 k 2 2 H < 1 2 . So set k = H + 2 ≥ 4. We get
Thus we have that with probability <
, we have a collision in the upper triangle of size H + 2. The lemma follows because of the symmetry of the matrix.
We are now ready to solve the combinatorial problem of Section 5:
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Assume the event of Lemma D.1 happens (it happens with probability 1 − β 2 2 − H ). Consider the largest collision in ζ; suppose its size is c 1 and its value is v 1 . It has all distinct rows (because η j values are distinct by the assumption that Lemma D.1 holds). Therefore, without loss of generality, we can assume that the collision occurs in rows 1, . . . , c 1 of ζ (this is just for convenience of notation). Call rows 1, . . . , c 1 the first layer of ζ. Consider the ith row of the first layer and the entry in that row that participates in the collision. That entry has value v 1 , and therefore h i = η j ⊕ v 1 for some η j . Thus, each of the values h 1 , . . . , h c 1 is simply some η value shifted by v 1 , and therefore the first layer of ζ corresponds to some c 1 distinct rows of the matrix θ from the prelude problem (distinct because the problem statement requires the h values to be distinct), except with v 1 added to all values. Therefore, every collision that does not have value v 1 in the first layer of ζ is also a nonzero collision in θ; by the assumption that the event of Lemma D.1 holds, it has size at most C θ .
Consider now the second largest collision in ζ, of size c 2 and value v 2 . By the same argument as before, it has c 2 distinct rows. This time, some of these rows may be in the first layer of ζ; however, there are no than C θ such rows, because the first layer of ζ has no collisions with value not equal to v 1 of size greater than C θ . Let c 2 be the remaining rows; we know c 2 ≤ c 2 + C θ and can assume without loss of generality that these rows are c 1 + 1, . . . , c 1 + c 2 (again, this is just for convenience of notation). Call these rows the second layer of ζ. Suppose some other collisions occur in the second layer of ζ. Using the same argument we made for the first layer, it follows that these collisions correspond to nonzero collisions in θ (obtained by adding v 2 to all the values) and thus have size at most C θ .
In general, if we consider the ith largest collision in ζ of size c i , up to C θ (i − 1) of its rows can be from previous layers (i.e., up to C θ from each of the previous layers). Let c i be the remaining rows (call them the i th layer); we have c i ≤ c i + C θ (i − 1). No other collision in the i th layer is of size more than C θ .
Thus, the total size of γ collisions is at most c 1 +· · ·+c γ ≤ c 1 +c 2 +· · ·+c γ +C θ (1+2+· · ·+γ −1). Because c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c γ refer to sizes of nonoverlapping layers, their sum is at most α. The theorem follows by observing that 1 + 2 + · · · + γ − 1 < γ 2 /2 and by substituting C θ ≤ h + 2 from Lemma D.1.
E Proving Security without the Claw-Free Assumption
Our security proofs so far assumed that (π, ρ) is a claw-free pair. They need a slight adjustment if π is only a trapdoor permutation and ρ does not exist (see [DR02] for a discussion of the differences between claw-free and trapdoor permutations when used with random-oracle-based signature schemes).
In such a case, the goal of the reduction is to invert π * on a given input y. The reduction changes as follows: Line 17 of Sim-H, instead of picking y i using ρ * , picks y i at random, except for one randomly chosen H-query, when y i is set to equal y. When the forger produces a forgery, the value x n in the forgery will satisfy π(x n ) = y i for some y i chosen on Line 17 of Sim-H. This holds for the same reasons as in the claw-free case. With probability 1/q H , this y i is equal to y, and so π * (x n ) = y, and the reduction can output x n as a successful inversion of π * on y.
Thus, the reduction and its analysis remain essentially the same, except that the security is no longer tight: the probability of success of the reduction is reduced by a factor of 1/q H . Therefore, the statements of Theorems 4.2 and C.1 can be easily modified if the assumption changes from claw-free to trapdoor permutations: the probability formula simply needs to be reduced by a factor of q H .
F Handling Permutations with Different Domains, such as RSA
Similarly to the schemes of [LMRS04] and [Nev08] , our scheme extends to the case when each signer's permutation has its own domain, as long as no domain is much larger than the intersection of all the domains. For instance, if we instantiate our scheme with RSA using 2048-bit moduli, then each signer's permutation domain will be a subset of {0, 1} 2048 . The intersection of all the domains, however, will be at least the set of all 2048-bit strings that begin with 0, and thus no domain is more than twice the intersection of all the domains. (Following ideas of Zhu, Bao and Deng [ZBD05] , the scheme can also be generalized to the case of domains of very different sizes, such as when different signers use RSA moduli of different lengths; we do not present this generalization here, because we expect all the moduli to be of the same standardized length in a typical deployment.)
Changes to the Scheme To explain how we modify the scheme, we need to fix some notation. We will assume that the domains of all permutations are subsets of {0, 1} π , and that the intersection of all the domains contains some set D closed under ⊕ (recall that the operation does not have to be exclusive-or-any group operation over D will do). Furthermore, we will assume that there is an efficient and efficiently invertible bijection SPLIT that takes an element X of {0, 1} π and produces two values b, x, with x ∈ D and b ∈ {0, 1} b with b close to π − log 2 |D|. (For the case of RSA described above, b = 1. The function SPLIT sets b = 1, x = X − 2 2047 if X ≥ 2 2047 , and b = 0, x = X otherwise.)
We will change G to output elements of D instead of {0, 1} π . We will change
Step 6 of the signing algorithm as follows:
The signing algorithm will output b i in addition to x i . The entire vector b n will be input to the verifying algorithm, which will be modified as follows:
Step 2 will be replaced with
Changes to the Reduction The security reduction needs to modified as follows. Recall that the reduction relies on the HTree, which is built up so that a child node is always tethered to a parent node. We will change the definition of "tethered" (Definition 4.1): an H-query Q containing x = will be tethered to some node N i in the HTree if that node contains π i , y i such that there exists b ∈ {0, 1} b for which π i (SPLIT −1 (b, x)) = y i . Lookup (Algorithm 1) and FindClaw (Algorithm 3) will need to try all possible values of b to combine with the given x in order to find X to which π can be applied. Thus Step 4 of Lookup becomes Nodelist = {all nodes N in HTree containing π, y such that ∃b ∈ {0, 1} b such that π(SPLIT −1 (b, x)) = y} .
Step 5 of FindClaw becomes
Sim-H and Sim-S (Algorithms 4 and 5) need to search for y i and y , respectively, that are in D. Thus, Steps 16 and 17 in Sim-H need to be repeated until y i ∈ D (also, z i should be drawn from Domain(π * ) rather than {0, 1} π ). Similarly, Steps 9 and 10 need to repeatedly draw X R ← Domain(π * ) until y = π * (X ) is in D; the output of Sim-S should include (b , x ) = SPLIT(X ).
Finally, Step 2 of Sim-G (Algorithm 2) should draw g from D rather than {0, 1} π .
Changes to the Analysis The above changes to the reduction will cause it to run 2 b times slower (thus, twice as slow for the RSA example). The analysis undergoes the following changes. Lemma B.1 remains true, but the proof is a bit more delicate: when arguing about the correct simulation of G queries, we need to rely on the fact that the new procedures in Sim-H and Sim-S still produce an output for G that is uniform in D, because y i in Sim-H and y in Sim-S are uniform in D, because they are produced by sampling a uniform distribution until an element of D is found. Claim B.4 also remains true, using the same argument.
Equation 5 and Claim B.5 change as follows.
Claim F.1. Given two functions π 1 , π 2 whose domains are subsets of {0, 1} π = SPLIT −1 ({0, 1} b × D) and two uniformly chosen random values y 1 , y 2 in D, the probability that there exists x, b 1 , b 2 such that
holds is at most 2 3 b − π .
Proof. Define the set of preimages of y 1 as |D| . Thus, the desired probability is at most
Observing that α α·|{y 1 s.t. |S y 1 | = α}| = y 1 |S y 1 | = |Domain(π 1 )|, and that |Domain(π 1 )|/|D| ≤ 2 b , we get that the probability is at most 2 2 b /|D|. Further observing that |D| ≥ 2 π − b , we get the desired bound.
This change results in the corresponding change in Lemma B.3: the q 2 H 2 2 − π probability gets replaced by 
which is satisfied with probability 2 b − π . Thus, the probability in the statement of Claim B.9 changes to q H 2 b − π and the probability that FindClaw aborts (bounded in Lemma B.8) changes to
The above changes result in the the q H 2 − π term in the formulas of Lemma B.2 and Theorems 4.2 and C.1 being replaced with q H 2 3 b − π . Because b is much smaller than π , this change has no material impact on the security of the scheme.
G A Detailed Specification of the Signature Scheme
In this section we instantiate our signature scheme with RSA and describe implementation details. The following issues, in particular, need to be decided.
• How to encode multiple arguments to a hash function into a single string? We use simple concatenation; to provide for unique parsing (which is needed for the security proof), we ensure that there is at most one variable-length value in the concatenation.
• How to encode the empty string ? We use zero strings of the appropriate length, because it causes no difficulty for our scheme.
• How to convert integers to bit strings and back? We use standardized conversion routines.
• What to use for the long-output hash function G? We use an industry-standard "mask generation function."
• How to represent the permutation π i as input to the hash function? Any fixed-length encoding than unambiguously specifies the RSA modulus N and exponent E will be fine. However, there may be situations in which a more convenient public-key "fingerprint"-such as the hash value of the certificate-may be more readily available. Such a fingerprint is also acceptable, as long as it is computed by applying some cryptographic hash function to an unambiguous encoding of the public key (in the proof, the hash function would have to be modeled as a random oracle, and the reduction would know the value of the public key by looking at queries to this hash function).
We simultaneously specify two versions of our scheme: the version with random r of length r,r (as described in Section 3) and the version with shorter input-dependent pseudorandom r of length r,p (as described in Section 5). Because most the steps are the same, we combine the two versions into one specification.
G.1 Parameters, notations, and primitives
We specify our protocol in terms of bit strings; lengths are bit lengths. However, if all lengths are multiples of eight, then the protocol can be implemented in terms of octet strings; the specification does not convert lengths that are multiples of eight into lengths that are not multiples of eight. The following bit lengths are fixed:
• Length h of the hash output
• Length π of the RSA modulus
• Length r,r of the per-signature randomness r (needed only if the random-r version of the protocol is used-see Section 3)
• Length k of a pseudorandom function key (needed only if the input-dependent-r version of the protocol is used-see Section 5)
• Length r,p of the pseudorandom function output (needed only if the input-dependent-r version of the protocol is used-see Section 5)
• PKFingerPrint(P K i ) produces a length f bit string which is a fingerprint of the public key P K i = (N i , E i ) obtained from RSAGEN. This may be any fixed-length encoding from which N i and E i can be unambiguously obtained, such as the DER encoding [ITU02] of P K i , or the string I2BSP(n, π )||I2BSP(e, π ) (in which case f = 2 π ). It may also be the cryptographic hash function H applied to any unambiguous (not necessarily fixed-length) encoding of N, E. For example, a certificate fingerprint computed with the hash function H will work. Whatever option is chosen, it is important that the length f should be fixed and at least h .
G.2 Algorithms
Key generation, signing, and verifying are specified in Algorithms 6, 7, and 8. There are switches in the algorithms to indicate which version (random-r or input-dependent-r) is being run. To help with implementation, we also specify the types and/or bit lengths for each value of the protocol. We do not specify how to encode the keys and the signatures that are output by our algorithms, as this choice depends on the interoperability requirements of the application. DER encoding [ITU02] is one possible choice; simpler encodings-for instance, concatenation when all the lengths are unambiguously known-may also be a valid choice.
Algorithm 6 Gen: Key generation algorithm for the i th Signer
This produces an RSA modulus N i which is an integer in the range [0, 2 π − 1], a integer public exponent E i , and an RSA secret key SKRSA i .
2:
Ensure that the RSA modulus
Let k i be a random bit string of length k , obtained by running RAND( k ).
5:
return Public Key P K i = (N i , E i ) and Secret Key SK i = (RSASK i , k i ). 6: else 7:
return Public Key P K i = (N i , E i ) and Secret Key SK i = RSASK i .
H A sample set of parameter lengths RSA modulus length.
The choice of RSA modulus length is essentially orthogonal to the choice of all the other parameters, because it depends only on one's belief about the security of RSA. We will use 2048-bit modulus n, which NIST recommends for use until the year 2030 [BBB + 07, Table 4 ]. Thus, π is 2048 bits.
Choosing f , r and h .
Once the RSA modulus length is set, security depends on the term subtracted from ε in Theorem 4.2 (for the random-r version) or Theorem C.1 (for the inputdependent-r version). We will aim for 128-bit security against adversarial running time. We bound the adversarial running time t in terms of the number of queries it issues, so that t ≥ q S + q G + q H .
We will also aim for 60-bit security against the chosen message attack against an honest signer. This number is lower than 2 128 , because every signature has to be issued by the honest signer-thus, as opposed to hash values, an adversary cannot simply marshal more computational resources in order to get more signatures. We note that for an honest signer to issue 2 60 signatures, assuming a public key is valid for one year, it would have to produce about 40 billion signatures per second. (Our benchmarks in Section 6 indicate that consumer-grade general-purpose PCs can produce about 100 signatures per second, so this builds in some safety margin.) Thus, we want to make sure the term subtracted from ε is at most about t2 −128 + q S 2 −60 . In fact, for the truly-random-r version, we will do better: we will get close to t2 −128 as long as q S ≤ 2 60 . For the input-dependent-r version, we will also do better when q S < 2 60 , because we will get close to t2 −128 + q 2 S 2 −120 . Given this goal, we choose the following parameters:
• Instantiate hash H() with SHA-256 [SHA08] so h is 256 bits.
• When using the random-r version, we have r,r 192 bits.
• Since we use HMAC instantiated with H(), the PRF key has k = h as 256 bits.
• When using the input-dependent-r version, we have r,p is 128 bits.
Random-r version.
Plugging these values (with r = r,r ) into Theorem 4. as desired. In both versions, if the function PKFingerPrint does not explicitly output the public key but rather hashes it using SHA-256, then there will be an additional security loss of 2 128 , because a collision of two key fingerprints will mean that the reduction R cannot deduce which π the forger F is using in its H-query.
I Our Scheme and History-Free Signatures
The definition of mezzo aggregation unforgeability satisfied by history-free signatures [FLS11] requires that the signature scheme, in addition to preventing forgery on new messages, should also prevent certain "reordering and recombining." To be precise, it means that the scheme should prevent the adversary from outputting an aggregate signature on messages (m 1 , . . . , m n ) such that
• there are two consecutive uncorrupted signers i, i + 1, and
• signer i was asked by the adversary to produce a signature on m i and output σ i in response, and
• signer i + 1 was asked by the adversary to produce a signature on m i+1 , but not with the value σ i as the aggregate-so-far.
(the authors of [FLS11] formulate their requirements differently, but this formulation can be easily seen equivalent). Such a strict requirement cannot possibly be satisfied by any scheme in which signer i+1 ignores some components of σ i , because the adversary could simply modify those components of σ i when querying signer i + 1. Thus, our scheme, in which σ i contains r i (which could be sent directly to the verifier and simply bypass signer i + 1) does satisfy the definition of [FLS11] simply for syntactic reasons.
Nevertheless, our scheme satisfies the definition of [FLS11] in spirit: it ensures m i was queried to signer i before m i+1 was queried to signer i + 1, and that the output of signer i was used as an input to signer i + 1. Thus, our scheme also makes the same "reordering and recombining" of signatures impossible. We outline how this can be shown by a small case analysis.
Suppose the adversary outputs a forgery; let i be the first location where the reordering condition is violated. Let x i be the value computed as part of the verification process. If x i was never queried to signer i + 1, then our security reduction still works for signer i + 1 (a forgery on a new x i will work just as well as a forgery on a new m i+1 , since x i is also input to H, so Lemma B.8, which is the only place where we use that m i+1 is new, still holds). Thus, x i must have been queried to signer i + 1.
Suppose, then, that x i was output in response to a sign query for signer i after it was queried to signer i + 1. The probability of such an event is very low: in responding to the signature query, signer i will pick a fresh r value, which will ultimately determine the x value output by the signer. (To bound this probability, observe that in order for the adversary to hit the correct x i , it has to either get a collision on the input to G during a signature query, which is already accounted for in our reduction, or get G to output the correct π -bit string on a fresh random input, which happens with probability 2 − π .)
The only remaining case is that x i was never output in response to a signature query for signer i. That means that when signer i was queried on m i and x i−1 , either the r i value output by signer i or the h i−1 value supplied with the query was different from the one in the forgery. If r i is different in the forgery than in the signing query, our security reduction still goes through for signer i, since a forgery on a new r i will work just as well as a new m i in Lemma B.8. Finally, if r i is the same and h i−1 is different in the forgery than in the signing query, we observe that the query to signer i must have been on an invalid h i−1 . We therefore modify Sim-S (Algorithm 5) as follows: if the hash query Q is tethered, but not to the input value h, then produce η using Sim-H. Thus, the hash query that is involved in the forgery-namely, the query (π i , m i , r i , x i−1 ) will be answered using Sim-H and therefore Lemma B.8 still goes through. The modification results in a tiny increase in the abort probability because of the possibility of an additional GT collision during the signature query and a slightly larger GT.
